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We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the
coplayer, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description
recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a
two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood.
The system shows a strong segregation independent of parameters. The introduction of a local conversion
mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game.
In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on
both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in
the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes
unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of complex systems with game theoretic interac-
tions has recently attracted a lot attention in statistical physics,
biology, behavioral sciences, and economics. In contrast to
standard game theory [1] the focus has recently been on evo-
lutionary game theory [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In particular, the pris-
oner’s dilemma [7] has become the metaphor for the evolu-
tion of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals. If
the game is not repeated, the dominating strategy is to defect.
However, repeated interactions of individuals memorizing the
past can establish high levels of cooperation from direct reci-
procity [7]. Reciprocity works also indirectly if individuals
can observe the behavior of others and cooperate with respect
to the reputation of others [8, 9].
Real world interactions are often restricted to small local
groups. Realizing that territoriality can have strong influ-
ences on the evolution of cooperation, Axelrod proposed the
study of a spatially extended prisoner’s dilemma [7]. Nowak
and May studied a cellular automaton based on the prisoner’s
dilemma [10]. They found that reducing interactions to small
local groups can promote cooperation, as cooperative clusters
minimize their contacts with neighboring defectors. Their pa-
per initiated an intensive research on spatially extended games
on two dimensional lattices [11, 12, 13, 14] and network
topologies [15, 16, 17, 18]. However, spatial structure does
not necessarily lead to an increased level of cooperation [19].
Another mechanism that can promote cooperation among
related individuals is kin selection [20]. Although kin se-
lection is controversial in biology, indications for similarity
based interaction mechanisms have been found on the molec-
ular level [21, 22]. Riolo et al. introduced a model in which
agents are equipped with traits that allow one to discriminate
between different groups of players [23]. It has been argued
that the model is of limited biological relevance, as agents are
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forced to cooperate within their own group [24, 25]. However,
cooperation can evolve from a combination of kin selection
and reciprocity, which can promote such an intragroup coop-
eration. The mechanism that leads to cooperation does not
have to be the same for interaction within groups and between
groups. In spatially extended systems agents can only pros-
per if they get sufficient support from their neighbors. Hence,
cooperation based on similarity will lead to a segregation of
different groups in spatially extended system [26].
Although the importance of group memberships is stressed
in the social sciences [27], segregation is usually not desired in
social systems. We raise the question on the minimal require-
ments for agents in order to avoid this kind of segregation.
We introduce a forecast rule that helps to overcome the seg-
regation, leading to a population in which agents support oth-
ers regardless of their group membership. The corresponding
spatial pattern can be stabilized by a linear global feedback.
II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
The evolution of cooperation in large populations is usu-
ally analyzed in systems based on public goods games [28].
For each cooperation a cost ci > 0 depending on the tag of
the player is incurred which results in a benefit b > ci for
the interaction partner. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves
to two groups of agents only, red and blue. In every group
there are two kinds of players. Intolerant players support only
others with the same tag (T = 0). Tolerant players (T = 1)
support any other player, regardless of his group membership.
The payoff of every player depends on the strategies of his
interaction partners. We introduce nr1, nr0, nb1 and nb0 for the
number of interaction partners that are tolerant red, intolerant
red, tolerant blue and intolerant blue, respectively. The payoff
can be written as
Π(x)=
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. (1)
In the following we restrict ourselves to cr = cb = c. The
system with cr 6= cb is analyzed in Section IV. In a single
interaction the payoff is b − c if both players cooperate with
each other, −c indicating that the player has been exploited,
and b indicating that the player has exploited his interaction
partner. The payoff is zero when both players refused to co-
operate. The tolerant strategies are dominated by the intoler-
ant strategies, as the payoffs of the T = 1 strategies are never
higher than the payoffs of the T = 0 strategies. In well mixed
systems without spatial structure this leads to bistability. One
group becomes extinct and the other group dominates in the
two evolutionary stable Nash equilibria with intolerant players
of one tag only. An alternating dominance of both groups can
be generated if there is a drift towards more tolerance [29].
III. SPATIALLY EXTENDED SYSTEM
Players are arranged on a two dimensional regular cubic
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The system size
is N = L × L. Each player interacts with his eight nearest
neighbors (Moore-neighborhood), i.e. nr0+nr1+nb0+nb1 = 8.
After interacting with all the neighbors, the players update
their strategy synchronously. This corresponds to discrete,
non-overlapping generations. Strategies are updated due to
the deterministic “best takes over” rule [30]; i.e. i switches
to the strategy among its nearest neighbors that reached the
highest payoff;
st+1i = s
t
j where j = argmax
j∈NN(i)
Πtj . (2)
If several nearest neighbors with different strategies have the
same success, players keep as much of their identity as pos-
sible. Choosing between switching tag or tolerance, players
will switch their tolerance. This ensures that the update rule
remains deterministic. However, these additional rules apply
only in very rare cases. Note that the new strategy of a player
depends on the strategies in his 5 × 5 neighborhood, as the
payoffs in his 3 × 3 neighborhood are involved. Self interac-
tions can be neglected in our case. Hence, the game can be
described as a deterministic cellular automaton with 424 up-
date rules. This is in contrast to the usual prisoner’s dilemma,
where “only” 224 update rules are necessary [10]. A modifica-
tion of the cooperation cost leads to a modification of the up-
date rules, see Appendix A for details. The extension of the
usual prisoner’s dilemma to four strategies complicates the ap-
plication of many tools for spatial games, as pair approxima-
tion [13, 14, 31], fundamental clusters [32, 33], or mapping to
Ising models [12].
A. Segregation in the basic system
As the tolerant strategies can easily be exploited by intoler-
ant players from the other group, they can only survive with
sufficient support from surrounding players, cf. Fig. 1. Hence,
the majority of players will be intolerant when the system
reaches a static state. A 3 × 3 cluster of intolerant agents
can always survive, as the player in the center has the high-
est possible payoff in his neighborhood. In general, a tolerant
player not interacting with intolerant players of the other tag
can always survive. If he interacts with such players, the co-
operation cost determines which kind of clusters are stable.
(red,1) (blue,1) (blue,0)(red,0)
FIG. 1: (Color online) Basic system without mutations. Only 10
generations after a random initialization the system reaches a static
state. The tolerant players can only survive if they have sufficient
support from their neighbors (c = 0.3, b = 1.0, L = 80).
As expected [26], the system shows a strong segregation.
Segregation between different agents in cellular automata has
already been observed in the seminal paper of Schelling [34].
However, in our case segregation is not directly based on ob-
servable traits of others, but on mutual support. Most of the
players are intolerant. Players that support others across the
segregation borders are always exploited, they cannot survive
if the cooperation cost is too high. This is consistent with the
mean field theory [29], where only fixed points with intolerant
players of one tag are stable.
The situation is slightly different if stochastic mutations are
included, as the system no longer becomes static. Tolerance
mutations increase the fraction of the tolerant agents, as there
is no equilibrium between tolerant and intolerant agents. The
tolerance mutations lead towards such an equilibrium, while
the population dynamics works against this equilibrium. Mu-
tations of the tags can also destabilize clusters, as they in-
troduce new agents into an environment that cannot produce
such agents by the population dynamics. This leads to the
dissapearance of small clusters, cf. Fig. 2.
The degree of segregation can be quantified utilizing the
“spatial dissimilarity index” D [35] defined as
D =
1
2
∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣
N jr
Nr
−
N jb
Nb
∣∣∣∣∣ , (3)
where N ir (N ib) is the number of red (blue) agents in subre-
gion i and Nr (Nb) is the total number of red (blue) agents.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Basic system with mutations. With 2% proba-
bility, the tag and the tolerance are modified independently. As in the
system without mutations, the different tags segregate in space. 100
generations after a random initialization, the majority of small clus-
ters seen in the system without mutations, cf. Fig. 1, has vanished due
to the destabilizing effect of the mutations. This leads to a longer cor-
relation length, see text. Colors are as in Fig. 1 (c = 0.3, b = 1.0,
L = 80).
Choosing a 3 × 3 neighborhood as subregion we find D =
0.715±0.001 (c = 0.3, N = 1000) indicating a strong degree
of segregation, compared to D = 19
1
512
∑9
j=0
(
9
i
)
|2j−9| =
35
128 ≈ 0.273 for a random population. D decreases less than
5% when c is increased (D = 0.729± 0.001 for c = 0.05 and
D = 0.707± 0.001 for c = 0.95).
Another possible measure for the segregation is the correla-
tion length λ. For simplicity, the correlations have only been
computed for one direction. The probability that an agent in
the distance of d has the same color decays as p ∝ e−d/λ. For
c = 0.3 we find a correlation length of λ = 5.85 ± 0.02.
The correlation length decreases slightly with increasing c
(λ = 6.25 ± 0.02 for c = 0.05 and λ = 5.65 ± 0.02
for c = 0.95). As discussed above, mutations lead to the
elimination of small clusters. Consequently, the correlation
length is increased by mutations. After 100 time steps we find
λ = 8.95 ± 0.03 (c = 0.3, tags and tolerances are mutated
with probability 2%), which is significantly higher than the
correlation length in the system without mutations. The seg-
regation properties are not altered if an asynchronous update
is applied instead.
Overall, the segregation properties and correlation length
are governed by the length defined by the size of the neigh-
borhood window. They are only marginally influenced by the
cooperation cost c.
B. Emergence of spiral waves from a local conversion
mechanism
The well mixed system was analyzed rigorously under the
influence of biased conversions towards tolerance [29]. These
biased conversions show an alternating dominance of both
groups in the mixed system.
Let us now introduce a local conversion mechanism that
promotes tolerance in a similar way. We assume that an agent
in a neighborhood consisting only of players of his own tag
becomes tolerant, if he did not switch his strategy in the same
time step due to selection. As only intolerant players utilize
the ability to distinguish between tags this could be motivated
by assuming some costs for this cognition system. These
conversions lead to a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle with four
strategies: If the neighbors are red, red agents become tol-
erant. In a red tolerant neighborhood intolerant blue agents
have the highest payoff. If these dominate the neighborhood,
the blue players should switch to the tolerant strategy. Finally,
in such a neighborhood the intolerant red agents gain the high-
est payoff. This in contrast to [36], where cyclic dominance is
explicitly included in a system with asynchronous update.
This cycle leads to the emergence of rotating spirals. The
arms of these spirals are travelling waves, as in the game of
rock-paper-scissors [37, 38] or in public goods games with
volunteering [14, 39]. The front of such a wave consists of
intolerant agents, these are followed by tolerant agents of the
same tag, cf. Fig. 3. These players can be exploited by in-
tolerant players with different tag, hence a new front with a
different tag can invade.
FIG. 3: (Color online) System with local conversions towards tol-
erance. Colors are as in Fig. 1. Agents become tolerant if their
new neighborhood has the same color, this leads to a rock-paper-
scissors-like cycle. Spirals that generate traveling waves appear
(c = 0.3, b = 1.0, L = 80).
In the case of asynchronous update spirals are replaced by
larger structures moving through the system. However, the
3
mechanism for the movement of these structures is the same
as for the spiral waves.
To locate the spiral tips quantitatively, the strategies
(r, 1), (r, 0), (b, 1), (b, 0) are associated with discrete indices
0, 1, 2, 3, respectively. Interpreting those as four possible an-
gles of a two-dimensional vector field, the curl can be calcu-
lated from a counterclockwise Stokes path on a 2 × 2 block.
For a continuous field of phases φ the topological charge of a
closed path Γ is defined by
q =
1
2π
∮
Γ
~∇φ · d~r. (4)
In our case, both space and phase are discrete; the phase is
measured in units of π/2. Along the Stokes path we compute
the phase differences
∆φ1 = xi+1,j − xi,j
∆φ2 = xi+1,j+1 − xi+1,j
∆φ3 = xi,j+1 − xi+1,j+1
∆φ4 = xi,j − xi,j+1 (5)
. In the discrete case a phase difference of two steps, or an-
gle π, may occur, and consistently can be interpreted as a
zero contribution to the Stokes integral (leading to the pos-
sibility of half-valued partial charges as discussed below).
Thus the phase differences are mapped on differences ∆qi
according to Table I. The topological charge is given by
TABLE I: Mapping of phase differences ∆φi to charge differences
∆qi.
∆φi −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3
∆qi +
1
4
0 − 1
4
0 + 1
4
0 − 1
4
.
q = ∆q1+∆q2 +∆q3+∆q4. A typical spiral tip consists of
two equal topological charges q = ± 12 in nearby positions. In
the stationary regime, the generic case is a pairing of two spi-
rals with different chiralities, i.e. different topological charges
q = ±1, near each other. For completeness, it should be noted
that the resulting curl field is defined on the dual lattice shifted
from the original one by a vector (12 ,
1
2 ).
A comparison between the strategy distribution and the cor-
responding charge distribution is shown in Fig. 4.
For a random initialization we find an topological charge
density of 〈ρ〉 = 0.219 ± 0.003, which is consistent with the
theoretical average value for independent topological charges
〈ρ〉 = 732 = 0.21875. The spatial game dynamics quickly
reduces the initial topological charge density. However, topo-
logical charges are generated and annihilated in a irregular
manner until the system reaches a stationary state, see Fig. 4.
IV. ASYMMETRIC SPATIAL SYSTEM
It seems natural to assume that the two different groups can
have two different costs of cooperation. For different costs cr
+
+
-
-
+
+
++
-
-
-- +
+
--
PSfrag replacements
0.00
0.01
0.02
0 100 200 300 400 500
t
〈ρ
〉
a (b)
(c)
FIG. 4: (Color online) Topological charges: Colors are as in Fig. 1.
(b) shows the spatial distribution of charges for the strategy distribu-
tion shown in (a). The sign + (-) indicates a topological charge of
q = + 1
2
(q = − 1
2
). Full charges are not stable and disappear imme-
diately after their generation. (c) shows a typical time development
of the average charge density 〈ρ〉. Initially, 〈ρ〉 drops rapidly. As
topological charges are generated and annihilated, the charge density
fluctates until the system reaches a stationary state (L=50).
and cb in Eq. (1) we find several distinct dynamical regimes,
as dominance of red players, spiral waves, etc., cf. Fig. 5 for
details.
Three different classes of transitions can be observed in Fig.
5. As in the symmetric game, the update rule is modified if
one of the cooperation costs crosses a threshold cost as ex-
plained in Appendix A. Such transitions are vertical and hori-
zontal lines in Fig. 5, e.g. the black dotted line in region (Br)
at cr = 13b. Note that the transitions shown in Fig. 9 (curve L)
can be observed on the diagonal cr = cb in Fig. 5. A second
kind of threshold is determined by cr/cb. These thresholds
govern the dynamical behavior and divide the phase plane in
Fig. 5 into the seven distinct regions. For cbcr >
8
3 red agents
dominate the population, for cbcr >
8
3 stationary clusters of in-
tolerant blue agents can survive. At cbcr = 2 travelling waves
can appear which suppress stationary clusters of intolerant
blue agents at cbcr <
8
5 . However, if the cooperation costs
are sufficiently high one group can take over the whole pop-
ulation after a transient period (region (Dr) in Fig.5). For
cb < cr the roles of red and blue are exchanged. Finally, we
have a third class of transitions which is given by linear equa-
tions cb = a + bcr. Here, the transition threshold is given by
a certain slope ∆cb∆cr = const. as for the second kind of transi-
tions. However, now one of the costs has to exceed a certain
threshold as for the first kind of transitions, e.g. the white dot-
ted line in region (D) of Fig. 5 is given by cb = 14b+ 38cr.
It is also posible to describe the phases in the asymmet-
4
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FIG. 5: Asymmetric system: Fraction of red agents (encoded in a
grayscale) in dependence of the cooperation costs cb and cr . In re-
gion (Ar) the population is dominated by red agents, for small cb
intolerant blue agents can survive. In region (Br) intolerant blue
players form channels in a sea of tolerant red agents. In (Dr) red tol-
erant agents dominate again. Region (E) shows spiral waves as the
symmetric game, cf. Fig. 3. Region (Cr) shows coexistence of spiral
waves from (E) and channels from (Br). For cb < cr the dynamics
is the same with the role of red and blue agents exchanged. Structures
inside the regions are determined by changes of the update rule. The
borders of these structures, e.g. the dotted lines in regions (Db)/(E)
and (Br), are given by linear equations cb = a + bcr, see text for
details (L = 100, averages over 50 time steps and 100 independent
realizations).
ric system by topological charge densities introduced in Sec.
III B, cf. Fig. 6.
V. FORECAST RULE
Here, we return to a system where both cooperation costs
are the same. Let us assume that the local conversion rule to-
wards tolerance is based on the new strategies of the neighbors
and applies also for players that switched their strategies due
to selection. Hence, now the update depends on the strategies
in a 7 × 7 neighborhood. Such a mechanism can be viewed
as a primitive forecast. Players become tolerant if they expect
their neighborhood to cooperate with them in the next genera-
tion. Even in this setting the local conversion rule leads to the
emergence of spiral waves.
It is straightforward to add an equivalent mechanism that
increases the fraction of intolerant agents. Tolerant agents can
become intolerant in order to protect themselves against ex-
ploiters that refuse to cooperate. Therefore, we decrease the
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FIG. 6: Asymmetric system: Average charge density in dependence
of the cooperation costs cb and cr . The regions are the same as in
Fig. 5. Topological charges can only be found when travelling waves
are present, i.e. in regions (C) and (E). The absence of topological
charges corresponds to the dominance of one group in the limit t→
∞. The highest charge densities are observed in the (C) regions and
in (E) near the diagonal cr = cb (L = 100, averages over 50 time
steps and 100 independent realizations).
tolerance of an agent if at least two neighbors will probably
exploit him in the next time step.
A. Cooperative fixed point
For c < 0.4b we observe cooperation across the segrega-
tion borders for synchronous update. For asynchronous up-
dates this fixed point does not become stable. The forecast
rule leads to a stable coexistence of red and blue tolerant
agents that provide help for everybody in their neighborhood,
cf. Fig. 7. As a discrimination between different agents is
no longer necessary, this can be seen as a primitive mecha-
nism to overcome segregation. However, although the behav-
ior of all agents is independent of the tags, the different tags
are still segregated in space. The typical correlation lengths
are larger than in the system without conversion mechanisms.
For c = 0.3 we find λ = 8.32±0.02. The spatial dissimilarity
index is only slightly higher, we observe D = 0.719± 0.005.
Surprisingly the mechanism that enables agents to become
intolerant increases the total fraction of tolerant agents, as
it helps to stabilize tolerant domains. It is interesting that a
mechanism that increases intolerance helps to eliminate intol-
erance. However, the mechanism bears some resemblance to
the “tit-for-tat” strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [7],
which punishes others for not cooperating, but can also for-
5
FIG. 7: (Color online) System with forecast rule. Colors are as in
Fig. 1. Agents become tolerant if their neighborhood has the same
color and intolerant if at least 2 neighbors will refuse to cooper-
ate. This mechanism allows the coexistence of red and blue tolerant
agents, here the intolerant agents have been eliminated by the mech-
anism, leading to a static state (c = 0.3, b = 1.0, L = 80).
give defectors reestablishing cooperation. One can even ob-
serve different stationary structures that change periodically in
which intolerant agents survive, these resemble the “blinkers”
in the “game of life” [40]. For c > 0.4b the system reaches a
stationary state only in very rare cases. However, parts of the
system are still dominated by tolerant agents. In the case of
c > 0.5b this is not longer the case, here intolerant agents are
found in the whole system.
Note that such a forecast rule cannot stabilize the coopera-
tive fixed point in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma [10], as de-
fectors have always a higher payoff than neighboring cooper-
ators.
B. Feedback Stabilization
For cooperation costs c > 0.5b the tolerant fixed point is
unstable. However, we can enforce cooperative behavior by
global feedback on the cooperation costs. In social systems
this corresponds to adapting taxes with respect to the state of
the society. Specifying a desired fraction of tolerant agents
f⋆tol we update the cost depending on the current fraction of
tolerant agents f ttol as
ct+1 = ct + α
(
f⋆tol − f
t
tol
)
ct. (6)
This mechanism can stabilize points with f⋆tol < 1 even for
c > 0.5b. For each f⋆tol the cost fluctuates around a threshold
that is determined by a change of the update rule, cf. Appendix
A.
For the mean field theory we have a fixed point for ftol =
1 [29], which is only stable for very low cooperation costs.
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FIG. 8: Time evolution of the system with linear feedback. Cost
of cooperation (gray) and fraction of tolerant agents (black). The
fraction of tolerant agents decreases rapidly when the cost reaches
the threshold c = 0.5 (f⋆tol = 0.8, α = 0.01, c0 = 0.5, N = 200).
However, this fixed point cannot be stabilized with the linear
feedback from Eq. (6).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated spatial segregation, pattern formation,
and control in a spatial version of a public goods game with
cooperation based on the similarity between players. This
type of model may establish a useful approach for a large va-
riety of economical and social systems, where agents may act
not only upon economical considerations, but also based on
similarity or group membership. Generalizations to more de-
tailed agents can be performed in a straightforward manner,
yet our four state model already is capable of showing differ-
ent phase states from stationary segregation to complex spa-
tiotemporal behavior.
Particularly, it is interesting to note that a simple forecast
rule can help to overcome segregation and lead to a stable pat-
tern of cooperating agents, as regions with limited coopera-
tion at the borders between groups are eliminated.However,
the different groups are still segregated in space.
APPENDIX A: INFLUENCE OF THE COST OF
COOPERATION
Due to the discrete nature of the total payoff, sharp steps
appear when the cost of cooperation c varies. As examples,
we consider the dependence of the fraction of tolerant agents
ftol and the donationrate, i.e. the fraction of cooperative in-
teractions, on the cost of cooperation, see Fig. 9. Due to the
symmetry between tags, the fraction of red and blue tolerant
agents can be computed from the fraction of tolerant agents
ftol/2, on average. In the same manner the fraction of intol-
erant agents of each group can be computed as (1 − ftol)/2.
The donation rate includes additional information on the spa-
tial distribution of the agents. The steps that are observed in
6
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FIG. 9: Dependence of different order measures on the cost of co-
operation c for four different update rules. (a) shows the fraction
of tolerant agents in the system. The donation rate, i.e. the fraction
of interactions in which a player cooperated with his co-player, is
shown in (b). The order measures are shown for the system without
mutations (N), with stochastic mutations (S), with the local conver-
sion mechanism described in Sec. III B (L), and with the forecast rule
(F) from Sec. V. The sharp steps correspond to modifications of the
update rules. (b = 1.0, L = 100, spatial averages over 50 indepen-
dent realizations and 50 update steps after a transient period of 50
update steps).
the order measures correspond to modifications of the update
rule, as described in [10]. The steps occur at the same posi-
tions for all order measures. However, the step size is differ-
ent for the fraction of tolerant agents and the donationrate, see
Fig. 9.
Consider a player x with a payoffΠ(x) and a second player
y with the payoff Π(y) and a different strategy. If a third
player z with a payoff Π(z) < Π(x),Π(y) in the neighbor-
hood of these two players searches for the best strategy, his
update rule changes at c = c⋆ if the sign of Π(x) − Π(y)
changes at c = c⋆. The corresponding values for c/b are given
by
Xb b−Xc c = Y b b− Y c c, (A1)
where 0 ≤ Xb (Y b) ≤ 8 is the number of agents that support
x (y) and 0 ≤ Xc (Y c) ≤ 8 is the number of agents that
are supported by x (y). For the situation shown in Fig. 10
we find for the center player Π(z) = 5b − 8c, for his left
neighbor Π(x) = 6b − 5c > Π(z) and for his right neighbor
6b-5c
6b-5c
6b-5c
5b-5c
5b-8c
5b-5c
8b-8c
8b-8c
8b-8c
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Example for a modification of the update
rule. Colors are as in Fig. 1. The numbers are the payoffs Π for this
neighborhood. This situtation is stable for c ≤ 2/3b, as the players
with Π = 6b − 5c that exploit the player in the center do not have
the maximum payoff Π = 8b − 8c.
Π(y) = 8b − 8c > Π(z). Hence, we find a modification of
the update rule for
c⋆ =
Xb − Y b
Xc − Y c
b =
2
3
b. (A2)
For c > c⋆ the center player will switch tolerance and group
membership. Other transitions can be found in the same way,
although the method of fundamental clusters [33] is more
complicated due to the high number of possible configura-
tions.
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